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1 
ARGUMENT 
A. 
IT ISN'T JUST ABOUT WAIVING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 
ALTOGETHER, IT'S ABOUT WAIVING THE HIGHEST LIMITS THE 
INSURED COULD PURCHASE 
U. C. A. §31A-22-302(l)(b)(2000) is crystal clear: "every policy" sold to comply with Utah 
law "shall include" uninsured motorist coverage, "unless affirmatively waived under Subsection 31A-
22-305(4)". Fulcrum argues that the waiver issue is a red herring because Tipton did not "waive" UM 
coverage, but actually purchased it in the amount of $65,000.00. (Appellee's Brief, p. 6, "Tipton did 
not need a waiver waiving UM coverage because she DID purchase UM coverage"). 
This argument is the red herring; the statute at issue goes beyond the waiver of uninsured 
motorist coverage in its entirety. U.C.A. §31A-22-302(l)(b)(2000) and U.C.A. §31A-22-
305(4)(a)(2000) cover the rejection of UM coverage in its entirety. Those statutes are not at issue, 
because, as Fulcrum points out, Tipton did get UM coverage, albeit at an amount less than 25% of the 
liability limits of her policy. The statute that is at issue, U.C.A. §31 A-22-305(3)(b)(2000), goes beyond 
that, and addresses the waiver of limits of coverage. This is required by "an acknowledgment form 
provided by the insurer that: (i) waives the higher coverage . . .". This acknowledgment form is 
wholly missing from Tipton's case. 
The difference is between waiving UM coverage entirely, and waiving the "higher coverage" 
which the insurer could sell the insurance consumer. 
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B. 
THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT AVAILABLE FROM THE INSURER IS NOT THE 
AMOUNT THE INSURED IS ACTUALLY SOLD BY THE INSURER 
Fulcrum argues that the "maximum available by the insurer" refers only to the amount 
actually purchased by the insured, and available under the existing policy. In other words, that Tipton 
got the maximum available under her policy, or $65,000.00. (Appellee's Brief, p. 15, "those words 
can mean only one thing, the UM coverage limits under the policy issued to Tipton, which were 
$65,000.00"). But the "maximum available under the insured's policy" phrase in the UM statute 
cannot just refer to the amount actually purchased. It has to refer to an amount that the insured 
potentially can purchase, apart from whatever is actually available under the existing policy. 
Otherwise, the statute is meaningless. The statute is looking at the insurance purchase transaction 
from a prospective standpoint; i.e., presenting the insured with options, not just referencing and 
enforcing what was actually purchased after the fact. 
The UM coverage is either the policy liability limits or the maximum available by the insurer, 
unless the insured chooses some lesser amount. These are three separate amounts. What the insured 
actually chooses might be the liability limits, or it might be the maximum available from the insurer 
or it might be some lesser amount. The maximum available amount is not simply what the insurer 
offers the insured. The statute contemplates that the insured be presented with a maximum amount, 
and a lesser amount, and be allowed to choose between the two. 
Consider Fulcrum's argument while looking at the entire statute: 
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(3)(b) For new [automobile insurance] policies written on or after January 1,2001, the 
limits of uninsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the 
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured motorist 
coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy, 
unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an 
acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage; and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase uninsured motorist 
coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle 
liability coverage or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits available by the 
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
U.C.A. §31A-22~305(3)(b)(2000). 
The statute contemplates that the "maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits available 
by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy" is some amount greater than the "lesser 
amount" that the insured purchases after being advised of the "higher coverage" including disclosure 
of the "additional premiums required to purchase uninsured motorist coverage . . . with limits equal 
to . . . the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits available . . .". The "maximum" insurance 
"available by the insurer" requires "additional premiums", over and above the lesser amount that the 
insured actually might purchase. Thus, the "maximum" insurance "available by the insurer" is some 
higher amount than that actually stated in the policy. Otherwise, what "additional premium" is the 
statute referring to? What "higher coverage" is referred to? Stated another way, the statute requires 
disclosure of the cost of purchasing something other than the amount stated in the policy. Stated 
another way, the statute allows the insured to purchase a lesser amount than the "maximum . . . 
available by the insurer . . .", after the required disclosure. If the maximum available is not 
something higher than the actual amount offered to the insured, then what is the meaning of the 
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reference to a "lesser amount"? The statute understands the "maximum available" to be something 
that the insured can choose or reject. It is not a tautological reference to the amount the insured 
actually purchases. 
This is even made more clear by considering the next section of the statute, which applies to 
renewal of existing policies: 
(3)(e)(i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after January 1, 2001, 
for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall disclose in the same medium as the 
premium renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage 
and the costs associated with increasing the coverage in amounts up to and including 
the maximum amount available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle 
policy. 
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry uninsured motorist coverage 
limits in an amount less than the insured's motor vehicle liability policy limits or the 
maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the 
insured's motor vehicle policy. 
U.C.A. §31A-22-305(3)(e)(i) and (ii)(2000). 
The statute applies to existing UM policies, and requires that the notice the purpose of UM 
coverage and its costs be sent to all insureds with UM coverage less than the liability limits or the 
maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor 
vehicle policy. Clearly, the amount of UM coverage actually carried, the liability limits, and the 
maximum UM coverage available by the insurer are three separate amounts. Otherwise, it is 
meaningless to require a notice to be sent to existing UM policyholders, who, by definition, already 
have the maximum available under their existing policies. Fulcrum's interpretation of the phrase 
"maximum UM coverage limits available by the insurer" would make this whole section pointless. 
But the court must interpret the statute in a way that makes sense for all portions. 
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c. 
THE UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE DISCLOSURE IS REQUIRED 
EVEN WHEN UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE IS PURCHASED 
Fulcrum now argues that the statutory waiver was not required because Tipton actually 
purchased UM coverage. (Appellee's Brief, p. 15, "only requires a waiver if the named insured is 
rejecting UM coverage"). But the UM coverage disclosure form is not just required when UM is 
completely rejected. The statute is not so limited. The statute is not just about buying or rejecting 
UM coverage. The prior version of the statute already did that. It required a minimum amount of UM 
coverage unless rejected by the insured. If that were all the Legislature had in mind, it would not 
have enacted the detailed current version of the statute. The current statute is all about advising the 
insured of the value of purchasing a substantial amount of uninsured motorist coverage, above the 
required minimum. This presupposes that UM coverage is being selected; it is obviously intended 
to help the insured make a choice as the amount of coverage to purchase, not just whether to 
purchase it or not. 
This point is clear when one looks beyond the portion of the statute that covers purchase of 
new policies, to the portion that covers renewal of existing policies, which is U.C.A. §31A-22-
305(3)(e)(i) and (ii)(2000). This requires the disclosure to be sent also to existing policyholders who 
have already purchased UM coverage. In contrast, the statute from the prior year, 1999, only stated 
that "the named insured may reject uninsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the insurer 
.. .".U.C.A. §3 lA-22-305(4)(a)(l 999). No disclosure of limit amounts, premiums, the purposes and 
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advantages of coverage, etc., was required, because all that the statute covered was the acceptance 
or rejection of coverage. 
D. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DECIDED THE AMBIGUITY AS 
A MATTER OF LAW, BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE IN FRONT OF IT 
If the insurance contract is ambiguous because it does not state the terms and limits of UM 
coverage, and assuming that the trial court should have looked to extrinsic evidence rather than just 
construing the contract against the insurer, the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law what 
the contract was intended to provide. Curiously, neither the deposition of the insurance agent nor 
Tipton was in front of the trial court. In the absence of that evidence, all the trial court had was the 
policy Tipton purchased during a prior policy year. That was insufficient evidence to make a 
determination as a matter of law as to the intent of the parties. The matter should have been set for 
an evidentiary hearing instead, so that the trial court could hear the testimony of the parties to the 
contract as to their intentions and actions. 
E. 
THE ARGUMENT ABOUT AMBIGUITY IS BASICALLY IRRELEVANT 
There are no terms in the contract that are ambiguous. The only ambiguity claimed by 
Fulcrum is the fact that there is no UM endorsement attached. Whether or not Tipton, or Fulcrum, 
or the trial court feel the contract is ambiguous is beside the point. The question of whether an 
insurance contract is ambiguous is a matter of law, and the parties and the trial court do not bind the 
appellate court in its determination of a matter of law. Whether the trial court should have looked 
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beyond the four corners of the insurance policy or not, whether the policy was ambiguous or not, 
it is undisputed that there was no disclosure made as required by U.C. A. §31 A-22-305(3)(b)(2000). 
The real question is the effect of that non-compliance by the insurer. 
CONCLUSION 
The statutory waiver at issue is not the waiver of UM coverage generally, but that statute that 
requires waiver of "the higher coverage" that the insurance consumer could purchase. The "higher 
coverage" in the statute is not just the amount inserted into the policy by the insurer. It refers to either 
the liability limits, or the maximum coverage available to the consumer. Tipton did not get the benefit 
of the acknowledgment form outlining the purposes of UM coverage and the costs of the available 
coverages. Tipton should get what the Legislature intended: the maximum amount, measured by her 
bodily injury limits of $300,000, in the complete absence of evidence that only a lesser amount could 
have been purchased. 
DATED THIS 10th day of March, 2006. 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Kevin K. Robson 
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ADDENDUM 
U.C.A. §31 A-22-305(2000) 
10 
31A-22-304 INSURANCE CODE 264 
(6) (a) If a policy containing motor vehicle liability cover-
age provides an insurer with the defense of lack of 
cooperation on the part of the insured, that defense is not 
effective against a third person making a claim against 
the insurer, unless there was collusion between the third 
person and the insured. 
(b) If the defense of lack of cooperation is not effective 
against the claimant, after payment, the insurer is sub-
rogated to the injured person's claim against the insured 
to the extent of the payment and is entitled to reimburse-
ment by the insured after the injured third person has 
been made whole with respect to the claim against the 
insured. 
(7) A policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under Sub-
section 3lA-22-302(l) may specifically exclude from coverage 
a person who is a resident of the named insured's household, 
including a person who usually makes his home in the same 
household but temporarily lives elsewhere, if: 
(a) at the time of the proposed exclusion, each person 
excluded from coverage satisfies the owner's or operator's 
security requirement of Section 41-12a-301, indepen-
dently of the named insured's proof of owner's or opera-
tor's security; 
(b) the named insured and the person excluded from 
coverage each provide written consent to the exclusion; 
and 
(c) the insurer includes the name of each person ex-
cluded from coverage in the evidence of insurance pro-
vided to an additional insured or loss payee. 
(8) A policy of motor vehicle liability coverage may limit 
coverage to the policy minimum limits under Section 31A-22-
304 if the insured motor vehicle is operated by a person who 
has consumed any alcohol or any illegal drug or illegal 
substance if the policy or a specifically reduced premium was 
extended to the insured upon express written declaration 
executed by the insured that the insured motor vehicle would 
not be so operated. 2000 
31A-22-304. Motor vehic le l iability pol icy minimum 
limits. 
Policies containing motor vehicle liability coverage may not 
limit the insurer's liability under that coverage below the 
following: 
(1) (a) $25,000 because of liability for bodily injury to 
or death of one person, arising out of the use of a 
motor vehicle in any one accident; 
(b) subject to the limit for one person in Subsection 
(a), in the amount of $50,000 because of liability for 
bodily injury to or death of two or more persons 
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in any one 
accident; and 
(c) in the amount of $15,000 because of liability for 
injury to, or destruction of, property of others arising 
out of the use of a motor vehicle in any one accident; 
or 
(2) $65,000 in any one accident whether arising from 
bodily injury to or the death of others, or from destruction 
of, or damage to, the property of others. 1993 
31A-22-305. Uninsured and under insured motorist 
coverage. 
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes: 
(a) the named insured; 
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, 
marriage, adoption, or guardianship, who are residents of 
the named insured's household, including those who usu-
ally make their home in the same household but tempo-
rarily live elsewhere; 
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle 
referred to in the policy or owned by a self-insurer; and 
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages 
against the owner or operator of the uninsured or 
underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury to or 
death of persons under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c). 
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" in-
cludes: 
(a) (i) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of 
which is not covered under a liability policy at the 
time of an injury-causing occurrence; or 
(ii) (A) a vehicle covered with lower liability limits 
than required by Section 31A-22-304; 
(B) the vehicle described in Subsection 
(2)(a)(ii)(A) is uninsured to the extent of the 
deficiency; 
(b) an unidentified vehicle that left the scene of an 
accident proximately caused by the vehicle operator; 
(c) a vehicle covered by a liability policy, but coverage 
for an accident is disputed by the liability insurer for more 
than 60 days or, beginning with the effective date of this 
act, continues to be disputed for more than 60 days; or 
(d) (i) an insured vehicle if, before or after the acci-
dent, the liability insurer of the vehicle is declared 
insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction; 
(ii) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is 
uninsured only to the extent that the claim against 
the insolvent insurer is not paid by a guaranty 
association or fund. 
(3) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-
22-302(l)(b) provides coverage for covered persons who 
are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or 
operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily 
injury, sickness, disease, or death. 
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 
2001, the limits of uninsured motorist coverage shall be 
equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor 
vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured 
motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under 
the insured's motor vehicle policy, unless the insured 
purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an 
acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of uninsured 
motorist coverage; and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to 
purchase uninsured motorist coverage with limits 
equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor 
vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured 
motorist coverage limits available by the insurer 
under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(c) Uninsured motorist coverage may not be sold with 
limits that are less than the minimum bodily injury limits 
for motor vehicle liability policies under Section 31A-22-
304. 
(d) The acknowledgment under Subsection (3)(b) con-
tinues for that issuer of the uninsured motorist coverage 
until the insured, in writing, requests different uninsured 
motorist coverage from the insurer. 
(e) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices 
sent after January 1, 2001, for policies existing on 
that date, the insurer shall disclose in the same 
medium as the premium renewal notice, an explana-
tion of the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage 
and the costs associated with increasing the coverage 
in amounts up to and including the maximum 
amount available by the insurer under the insured's 
motor vehicle policy. 
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that 
carry uninsured motorist coverage limits in an 
amount less than the insured's motor vehicle liability 
265 INSURANCE CODE 31A-22-305 
policy limits or the maximum uninsured motorist 
coverage limits available by the insurer under the 
insured's motor vehicle policy. 
(4) (a) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4Kb), the 
named insured may reject uninsured motorist cover-
age by an express writing to the insurer that provides 
liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a). 
(ii) This rejection shall be on a form provided by 
the insurer that includes a reasonable explanation of 
the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage. 
(hi) This rejection continues for that issuer of the 
liability coverage until the insured in writing re-
quests uninsured motorist coverage from that liabil-
ity insurer. 
(b) (i) All persons, including governmental entities, 
tha t are engaged in the business of, or that accept 
payment for, transporting natural persons by motor 
vehicle, and all school districts that provide transpor-
tation services for their students, shall provide cov-
erage for all vehicles used for that purpose, by pur-
chase of a policy of insurance or by self-insurance, 
uninsured motorist coverage of at least $25,000 per 
person and $500,000 per accident. 
(ii) This coverage is secondary to any other insur-
ance covering an injured covered person. 
(c) Uninsured motorist coverage: 
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 
34A, Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation Act; 
(ii) may not be subrogated by the Workers' Com-
pensation insurance carrier; 
(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided 
by Workers' Compensation insurance; and 
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subroga-
tion only after the covered person has been made 
whole. 
(d) As used in this Subsection (4): 
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning 
as under Section 63-30-2. 
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under 
Section 41-la-102. 
(5) When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor 
vehicle under Subsection (2)(b) proximately caused an acci-
dent without touching the covered person or the vehicle 
occupied by the covered person, the covered person must show 
the existence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear and 
convincing evidence consisting of more than the covered 
person's testimony. 
(6) (a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage 
for two or more motor vehicles may not be added together, 
combined, or stacked to determine the limit of insurance 
coverage available to an injured person for any one 
accident. 
(b) (i) Subsection (6)(a) applies to all persons except a 
covered person as defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii). 
(ii) A covered person as defined under Subsection 
(7)(b)(ii) is entitled to the highest limits of uninsured 
motorist coverage afforded for any one vehicle that 
the covered person is the named insured or an in-
sured family member. 
(iii) This coverage shall be in addition to the cov-
erage on the vehicle the covered person is occupying. 
(iv) Neither the primary nor the secondary cover-
age may be set off against the other. 
(c) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of 
an accident shall be primary coverage, and the coverage 
elected by a person described under Subsections (l)(a) and 
(b) shall be secondary coverage. 
(7) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section ap-
plies to bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death of covered 
persons while occupying or using a motor vehicle only if 
the motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a 
claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired 
or replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the 
policy. Except as provided in Subsection (6) or (7), a 
covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy 
that includes uninsured motorist benefits may not elect to 
collect uninsured motorist coverage benefits from any 
other motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is a 
covered person. 
(b) Each of the following persons may also recover 
uninsured motorist benefits under any other policy in 
which they are described as a "covered person" as defined 
in Subsection (1): 
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an 
uninsured motor vehicle; and 
(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or 
using a motor vehicle that is not owned by, furnished, 
or available for the regular use of the covered person, 
the covered person's resident spouse, or the covered 
person's resident relative. 
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7)(b) is not barred 
against making subsequent elections if recovery is un-
available under previous elections. 
(8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor ve-
hicle" includes a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or 
use of which is covered under a liability policy at the time 
of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has insuffi-
cient liability coverage to compensate fully the injured 
party for all special and general damages. 
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not 
include: 
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liabil-
ity coverage of the same policy that also contains the 
underinsured motorist coverage; or 
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as denned in Sub-
section (2). 
(9) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 
31A-22-302(l)(c) provides coverage for covered persons 
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners 
or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of 
bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death. 
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 
2001, the limits of underinsured motorist coverage shall 
be equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor 
vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured 
motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under 
the insured's motor vehicle policy, unless the insured 
purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an 
acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that: 
(i) waives the higher coverage; 
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of 
underinsured motorist coverage; and 
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to 
purchase underinsured motorist coverage with limits 
equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor 
vehicle liability coverage or the maximum 
underinsured motorist coverage limits available by 
the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
'(c) Underinsured motorist coverage may not be sold 
with limits that are less than $10,000 for one person in 
any one accident and at least $20,000 for two or more 
persons in any one accident. 
(d) The acknowledgment under Subsection (9)(b) con-
tinues for that issuer of the underinsured motorist cover-
age until the insured, in writing, requests different 
underinsured motorist coverage from the insurer. 
(e) The named insured's underinsured motorist cover-
age, as described in Subsection (9)(a), is secondary to the 
